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AbstrAct
Introduction
Moody and Marvell (MM) have now replied to our comment (Ayres and donohue 
2009) on their initial 2008 publication, “the debate on shall-Issue laws.”  MM begin their 
latest effort—“the debate on shall-Issue laws, continued”—by declaring that they “are 
not advocates” of laws granting citizens the right to carry concealed handguns (rtc laws). 
In support of this claim, MM note that they have published papers finding that RTC laws 
both reduce crime (two papers) and do not reduce crime (three papers). Given the fact that 
neither MM (2008) nor their latest comment tries to reconcile the internal conflict in their 
own writings, let alone the larger literature, it is puzzling that a tweak on our 2003 paper 
would lead them to conclude their 2008 paper by stating, “In our judgment, the weight of 
the evidence … indicates that shall issue laws reduce crime.”  to the extent that they have 
now backed away from that claim, progress will have been made.
Nonetheless, MM claimed to find support for the crime-reduction hypothesis 
by extrapolating some trends estimated in Ayres and donohue (2003). Indeed, MM 
criticized us for only evaluating the trend for five years, noting that 10 of the 24 
states on which we generated our trend estimates contained data for at least six 
years. We would have thought, though, that one would want to be very cautious in 
extending trends beyond five years when 14 of the 24 states have no post-passage 
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data beyond three years. Indeed, trying to draw inferences about what is happening 
to crime in 14 states five years after passage when one only has data for three years 
is the essence of extrapolating beyond the range of one’s data, which is always a 
perilous exercise. We are thus puzzled by their latest assertion that perhaps we “did 
not believe the implications of [our] model, since [it] contained trend variables that 
continue indefinitely” (Moody and Marvell 2009). Of course, every linear model may 
be thought to continue indefinitely, but we certainly wouldn’t encourage extrapolation 
beyond the range of the data over which the linear trend is estimated.
Moody and Marvell Misinterpret the Evidence 
from Donohue (2003)
MM’s latest comment also states that while they overlooked donohue (2003) in their 
2008 literature review, they have now examined that paper and conclude that “donohue’s 
own coefficients indicate a considerable benefit of the shall-issue law” (Moody and 
Marvell 2009). Figure 1 in their current reply purports to graph violent crime coefficients 
from table 8-5 in donohue (2003), but there are two problems with this showing. First, 
they incorrectly graph the estimates from donohue’s table (which should appear as a step 
function based on a succession of two-year dummy variables rather than a linear graph). 
second, and more importantly, MM misinterpret the estimates.3  
the most useful information from the table 8-5 estimates in donohue (2003) 
was the comparison of the estimated effect from one or two years before passage to 
two to three years after passage. As that article made clear, this comparison showed 
no evidence of a decline for violent crime, or any crime category for that matter. 
(Indeed, the only evidence of any impact was in the direction of increasing crime in all 
four property crime categories.)  As donohue (2003) explained, looking at estimates 
beyond two to three post-passage years was unwise since, after that point, one would 
be comparing the pre-passage dummy for 24 states that were to adopt the RTC law 
with a post-passage estimate for only 10 of those 24 states. Thus, MM’s Figure 1 fails 
the old apples-and-oranges test: the post-passage estimates on the right hand side of 
that figure are not comparable to the pre-passage figures on the left hand side of the 
figure. This point is so basic that one might have thought that it would only need to 
be made once (back in 2003), but apparently it needs repeating.
3 MM seek support for their position with a quote from david Mustard, but he, unfortunately, 
made the same mistake they make. Mustard (2003: 329).
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New State Panel Data Evidence from 1977 – 20064
MM then go on to tinker with their 1977-2000 county data in an effort to show 
that they can generate some results (using defective county data, including the highly 
flawed Florida data) that, in aggregate, will support their conclusion that the overall 
effect of rtc laws is a net reduction in crime.5   but time has now passed them by, 
as we tried to show in our previous graphs of the very different trends in crime after 
2000. MM take refuge in saying that our graphical depictions don’t control for other 
factors influencing crime. True enough. But we thought that our graphs would have 
made them cautious about making claims based on their incomplete data that the 
patterns of crime in the more recent data were more favorable in states that did not 
have rtc laws than in states that did. 
In any event, to address their concerns about the lack of controls, we extended 
our state panel data six additional years beyond that used by MM (who used county data 
from 1977-2000). Again, we believe that the advantages of county data (in enabling 
controls for county fixed effects) are outweighed by the poorer quality of county data. 
MM emphasized three econometric features in their estimations that we will follow 
in our analysis below. First, MM control for state trends. second, they cluster the 
standard errors. And third, they emphasize the hybrid specification, which allows for 
both a shift (upward or downward) in crime as well as a change in the trend of crime 
(the slope) following the adoption of an rtc law.6  MM note that, unless the shift 
variable is very large relative to the trend variable, in the end the trend variable will 
indicate the long-run effect of the law (assuming the specification is working well). 
All three of these features have become fairly standard in state panel data analyses, 
although the inclusion of state trends and clustering may be disputed by some.  
Again, as we illustrate below, the evidence is most supportive of the claim 
that rtc laws increase aggravated assault. but the original lott and Mustard (1997) 
specification suggests that RTC laws also increase rape, while the MM (2009) 
specification also suggests on its face that RTC laws reduce auto theft. But when 
we subject these specifications to a plausible robustness check, we see that while the 
evidence of an increase in aggravated assault is strengthened, the evidence concerning 
the effect of RTC laws on rape and auto theft become murkier still. The specific 
4 Although our newly created state data set contains crime data from 1977 to 2007, two of  the 
explanatory variables—arrest rate and police rate—are only available up to 2006. thus, all of  
our specifications can only be run on data up to 2006.
5 our previous comment on MM (2008) pointed out a number of  problems with the county 
data. note, too, that the FbI’s uniform crime reports have now withdrawn the 1993 county 
crime data used by MM, as it has been recognized as faulty. According to the national Archive 
of  criminal Justice data (nAcdJ), the FbI’s 1993 county (but not state) crime estimates 
were imputed incorrectly and so were made unavailable to the general public. the nAcJd 
anticipates being able to re-release updated county crime data for 1993 later this year. We also 
discuss below a problem with the MM incarceration data for 2000.
6 In addition to the hybrid model, we also generate estimates using the dummy variable and 
spline (or trend) models that we presented in our earlier comment. 
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explanatory variables used in these three specifications are shown in Table 1. In all 
cases, the dependent variable is the natural log of the crime rate (for each of seven 
Index I crime categories). 
A. Lott and Mustard Specification
In responding to the implicit invitation by MM that we add controls to our 
added years of crime data, we of course have to make some choices about the 
appropriate explanatory variables. since MM cited the original lott and Mustard 
study as providing evidence in support of the proposition that rtc laws reduce 
crime, one assumes that they would be interested to know whether the lott and 
Mustard explanatory variables would still provide support for the “more guns, less 
crime” hypothesis when estimated over the 1977-2006 period.7  the lott and Mustard 
specification is also important because the National Research Council (2005) report 
on RTC laws relied on this specification (run on county data) for the period 1977-
2000.
The Lott and Mustard explanatory variables are depicted in the first column 
of table 1 exactly as they were in the 1997 paper (and the national research council 
report), except for the three MM features described above and one that we added 
concerning the arrest rate variable that both lott and Mustard and MM employ. 
While we are not enthusiastic about this pseudo-arrest rate variable (for reasons 
previously discussed on p. 52 in our initial reply and elsewhere), we believe it is 
particularly inappropriate as an econometric matter to include the arrest rate in its 
contemporaneous form, as both pairs of authors have done. to understand this problem, 
consider their murder regression. In using the contemporaneous arrest rate, lott and 
Mustard and MM are essentially explaining murders (the left-hand side variable) with 
a ratio as a right-hand side variable that contains murders (in the denominator). to 
avoid this severe endogeneity problem, one should at least lag the arrest rate by one 
year—which we do below in every regression that uses that variable.
table 2 shows the results of our estimates of the impact of rtc laws using 
the lott and Mustard variables on the extended state panel data set. looking at the 
hybrid model, one sees that for six of the seven crime categories, the table suggests 
that rtc laws increase crime, although only one of these seven—aggravated assault—
is statistically significant at the .01 level. The only contrary evidence is in the property 
crime category, where on its face table 2 would suggest that rtc laws are associated 
with a decrease in auto theft, albeit at a lower level of significance (the .05 level). The 
fact that six of the seven crime categories are rising at least raises the specter that the 
one contrary estimate for auto theft is spurious. but even if one accepts the facial 
findings of substantially higher aggravated assaults and somewhat lower auto thefts, 
this would be a bad tradeoff since aggravated assault is much more socially costly 
7 lott and Mustard (1997) analyzed crime data for u.s. counties from 1977 to 1992 and con-
cluded that allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons deters crime.  
Ayres And donohue
econ JournAl WAtch                 222
than auto theft.8  In any event, this is not exactly a ringing endorsement of the more 
guns, less crime hypothesis.
Table 1: Three Different Sets of Explanatory Variables Used to Estimate the Impact of RTC Laws9, 10, 11, 12, 13
Lott-Mustard (1997) & NRC (2005) Moody-Marvell (2009) Ayres-donohue (2009) robustness check
RTC law dummy (see Appendix 1) rtc law dummy rtc law dummy
Post-passage RTC law trend Post-passage rtc law trend Post-passage rtc law trend
Lagged arrest rates1 lagged arrest rates lagged police rate2
4 real per capita income measures3 4 real per capita income measures 4 real per capita income measures 
State population state population
Population density4 Population density
Year dummies year dummies year dummies
With state trends With state trends With state trends
Percent pop white males 10-19
Percent pop white males 20-29 lagged incarceration rate5 lagged incarceration rate
Percent pop white males 30-39 unemployment rate unemployment rate
Percent pop white males 40-49 Poverty rate Poverty rate
Percent pop white males 50-64 Percent pop black
Percent pop white males 65+ Percent pop ages 10-19 Percent pop black males 10-19
8 donohue (2009) indicates that aggravated assault is both more common and, on average, 
more socially costly than auto theft. On the relative frequency of  the two crimes, see the first 
column of  table d1 in donohue (2009). on the relative cost, note that low-end estimates of  
the cost per crime are $19,500 for assault and $1,200 for auto theft (Table 4). The respective 
high-end estimates are $91,800 and $5,700 (table 5).
9 lott-Mustard and nrc lagged arrest rates: the arrest rate variable used in the lott and 
Mustard and MM specifications for the four violent crimes was calculated as the number of  
total arrests for violent crimes divided by the total number of  violent crimes.  For the three 
property crimes, the analogous overall property crime arrest rate is used.
10 Ayres-donohue lagged police rate: the police rate was obtained from local-level police 
protection figures from the Census Bureau.  According to the U.S. Bureau of  Justice Statistics 
(BJS), “police protection” refers to officers who have “the function of  enforcing the law, and 
preserving order and traffic safety and apprehending those who violate the law, whether these 
activities are performed by a police department, a sheriff ’s department, or a special police 
force” (bureau of  Justice statistics 2008).  Police rate was calculated as total police protection 
in a state per 100,000 population.
11 Lott-Mustard and NRC 4 real per capita income mesaures: The four individual real per 
capita income measures are personal income (defined in Appendix 4 below), unemployment 
benefits, income maintenance, and retirement payments. 
12 lott-Mustard and nrc population density was calculated by dividing a state’s total popula-
tion by the state’s area per square mile.
13 MM lagged incarceration rate density was calculated by dividing a state’s total population by 
the state’s area per square mile.
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Percent pop white females 10-19 Percent pop ages 20-29 Percent pop black males 20-29
Percent pop white females 20-29 Percent pop ages 30-39 Percent pop black males 30-39
Percent pop white females 30-39 Percent pop ages 40-49 Percent pop white males 10-19
Percent pop white females 40-49 Percent pop ages 50-64 Percent pop white males 20-29
Percent pop white females 50-64 Percent pop ages 65+ Percent pop white males 30-39
Percent pop white females 65+ lagged dependent variable
The above 12 demographic 
controls are repeated for blacks 
and “other” races (yielding a total 
of 36 demographic controls)
crack index
but there is more. the lack of any evidence in table 2 of a decline in murder 
rates associated with the adoption of RTC laws is particularly significant because of 
the prominence given to this precise issue in the 2005 national research council 
(NRC) report. In the final report, 15 of the 16 members of the Committee were not 
persuaded by the claims that rtc laws reduced crime. James Q. Wilson, however, 
issued a dissent in which he opined, “I find that the evidence presented by Lott and 
his supporters suggests that rtc laws do in fact help drive down the murder rate, 
though their effect on other crimes is ambiguous” (nrc 2005, 271). In particular, 
Wilson stated that “it is hard for me to understand” why lott’s claims that rtc “laws 
drive down the murder rate … are called ‘fragile’” (270). 
table 2 suggests that the nrc majority got it right: lott’s claimed murder 
effect disappears. this is the essence of fragility. the only difference between the 
regressions that persuaded Wilson that rtc laws reduce murder and the table 2 
regressions that undermine this view are: (1) Wilson was looking at county data 
for 1977-2000, while we present state data for 1977-2006; (2) we use the three MM 
features (state trends, clustering, hybrid model), while Wilson looked only at models 
without these features; and (3) we lagged the arrest rate to avoid the endogeneity 
problem from using contemporaneous arrest rates.
Despite the conflict between the NRC panel (which decided not to cluster 
the standard errors) and MM, who advocate clustering (thereby adhering to much 
current econometric practice—albeit on a question about which the literature has 
yet to achieve closure), this issue is irrelevant to the Table 2 finding of no support for 
the claim that rtc laws reduce murder. Whether one clusters the standard errors 
or not, the Table 2 coefficients do not support Wilson’s conclusion. In fact, without 
clustering, table 2 would indicate that not only do rtc laws increase aggravated 
assault (again at the .01 level of significance), but that they also increase murder, rape, 
robbery, and burglary (albeit at the .10 level).14  since lott opposes clustering and 
table 2 presents the lott and Mustard model, his approach now supports a broad 
conclusion that more guns generate more crime.
Were one inclined to follow Wilson’s approach and draw strong inferences from 
14 Lott (2004) concludes that “clustering by state is inappropriate and biases the results against 
finding statistically significant changes in crime rates” (19-20).
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one idiosyncratic set of regressions, one would presumably endorse the view that rtc 
laws increase aggravated assault and do not reduce murders, as shown in table 2 (while 
decreasing auto theft). Yet how much confidence can we really have in the Lott and 
Mustard specification given that, in addition to its other infirmities, it does not even 
include a variable known to be a powerful factor in reducing crime—the incarceration 
rate (Marvell and Moody 1994; Levitt 1996)? If the incarceration rate is correlated with 
the presence of rtc laws, then the resulting estimates on the impact of these laws 
would be marred by omitted variable bias. Since this was the precise specification on 
which Wilson relied, one again sees how unguarded he was in reaching his dissenting 
opinion based on a regression with no control for perhaps the most important influence 
on crime over the last three decades. 
Table 2: The Estimated Impact of RTC Laws, All Crimes, 1977-2006 State Data, Controlling for State Trends, 
Lott and Mustard Explanatory Variables, Lagged Arrest Rates, With Clustering15
Murder rape Aggravated Assault robbery
Auto 
theft burglary larceny
1. Dummy variable model: -2.63% -2.49% -1.14% -2.48% 2.98% -1.96% 1.22%
3.02% 2.24% 2.71% 2.59% 2.51% 1.30% 1.04%
2. Spline model: 0.79% 0.44% 2.48% 0.65% -1.55% 0.56% 0.36%
0.86% 0.79% 0.64% 1.09% 0.72% 0.79% 0.62%
3. Hybrid model:
     Postpassage dummy -3.38% -2.95% -3.20% -3.10% 4.38% -2.50% 0.98%
3.17% 2.47% 2.76% 2.66% 2.66% 1.59% 1.23%
     trend effect 0.96% 0.59% 2.64% 0.80% -1.78% 0.69% 0.31%
 0.87% 0.84% 0.66% 1.10% 0.77% 0.83% 0.65%
B. Moody and Marvell Specification
In their latest reply, MM also provide their own set of explanatory variables—some 
based on their own initial choices and some responding to our previous suggestions. the 
second column of our table 1 above displays the MM explanatory variables, but with the 
lagged (instead of contemporaneous) arrest rate. note that MM include incarceration 
rate as an explanatory variable. In at least this respect, the MM specification would 
appear to have a clear advantage over the Lott and Mustard specification, which had no 
control for incarceration.
table 3 provides aggregate estimates of the effects of rtc laws based on the 
15 For Table 2 as well as all subsequent tables, statistical significance is denoted as follows: esti-
mates significant at the .10 level are underlined, estimates significant at the .05 level are bolded, 
and estimates significant at the .01 level are bolded and underlined.  In addition, all tables pre-
sented in this paper display estimates for which robust standard errors are clustered by state.
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MM specification, again employing state data over the years 1977-2006.16  the table 
3 results are similar to those in table 2, although all of the estimated effects shrink 
noticeably. The table shows statistically significant increases in rape (at the .05 level 
of significance) as well as aggravated assault (at the .01 level). All four violent crime 
categories are consistent with increasing crime rates, although neither the murder 
increase nor the smaller estimated increase in robbery is statistically significant. 
Table 3: The Estimated Impact of RTC Laws, All Crimes, 1977-2006 State Data, Controlling 
for State Trends and Extending Crack, Moody and Marvell Explanatory Variables (with the 
exception of lagging the arrest rates), With Clustering




variable model: 0.40% -0.92% 1.02% 0.96% 1.36% -0.20% 0.83%
1.73% 1.27% 1.06% 1.41% 1.38% 1.06% 0.78%
2. Spline model: 0.34% 0.70% 0.98% 0.25% -0.06% 0.08% -0.05%
0.60% 0.34% 0.37% 0.41% 0.35% 0.28% 0.21%
3. Hybrid model:
Post-passage       
dummy 0.18% -1.43% 0.34% 0.81% 1.45% -0.26% 0.89%
1.86% 1.32% 1.19% 1.37% 1.38% 1.02% 0.76%
trend effect 0.33% 0.76% 0.97% 0.22% -0.12% 0.09% -0.09%
 0.62% 0.35% 0.39% 0.41% 0.34% 0.28% 0.21%
Once again, we should note that the MM specification undercuts Wilson’s 
claimed murder suppression effect even more thoroughly than the lott and Mustard 
specification did. On its face, it would appear that RTC laws are increasing rape and 
aggravated assault, but again we must ask: are these regression models working well? 
Appendix 2 tries to provide some information on that question by exploring the 
estimated effects that are generated for the other important variables of interest.
table A1 in Appendix 2 begins by examining the estimated effect of the 
incarceration rate on crime for the MM specification. For four of the seven crime 
categories, this table suggests that increases in incarceration have essentially no 
effect on crime. this seems implausible and is dramatically inconsistent with a large 
literature (Donohue 2009), including an earlier paper by Marvell and Moody (1994). 
16 the state-level crack measure—developed in Fryer et al. (2005) and used by MM—only 
goes up to 2000. Since the criminogenic influence of  crack had largely abated by 2000 it is 
probably reasonable to extend the crack variable simply by using 2000 values for 2001 to 2006, 
which is what we depict in table 3. It turns out that the crack variable makes little difference to 
the results from the MM regressions, whether one includes it or drops it for either 1977-2000 
or 1977-2006 state-level data.
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One has to ask: if the MM specification does a poor job of predicting the impact of 
incarceration on crime, should we believe that this specification can reliably estimate 
the impact of RTC laws on crime?
Further concerns about whether the MM specification is working well are 
provided in Appendix 2’s table A3, which shows the estimated effect of crack on 
crime. This table shows that MM’s crack variable has no statistically significant effect 
in raising the murder rate, which is contrary to the almost universal opinion that the 
rise of the crack cocaine phenomenon had a powerful effect in increasing murders 
in the United States in the late 1980s. While this may simply reflect the fact that it 
is a tricky proposition to capture the criminogenic influence of crime in a statistical 
measure, it likely means that crack’s large impact on murder is not adequately 
captured in the included crack variable. this implies that all regression estimates of 
the impact of rtc laws on crime are potentially marred by severe omitted-variable 
bias, especially since we know that the states that had the largest crack problems in 
the early days of the epidemic were states such as new york and california, which 
did not adopt RTC laws. Thus, what some of the early papers deemed to be a benefit 
of passing rtc laws in reducing murder may well be the effect of crack’s harmful 
impact on murder in states that chose not to adopt rtc laws. of course, the big 
question—yet to be resolved—is whether the apparent null effect of rtc laws on 
murders would be suggestive of crime increases if the regression models could correctly 
control for the impact of crack on murder.
C. A Robustness Check
While one might feel comfortable in concluding at this point that rtc laws 
increase aggravated assaults—and perhaps rape, if one prefers the MM specification to 
that of lott and Mustard—we have seen enough fragility in the panel data estimates of 
the effect of rtc laws to be cautious about leaping to strong conclusions. remember 
that all of our findings are based on statewide, aggregate hybrid models, estimated 
on state data, including state trends and clustering the standard errors. All of these 
points seem reasonable to us (and MM specifically endorse all but the aggregate 
estimates on state data), but it is probably useful to bear in mind that all of these 
choices have generated at least some contention in the published literature. Moreover, 
we ourselves have criticized elements of the lott and Mustard and MM models, owing 
to (1) their reliance on questionable arrest rate data; (2) their failure to include highly 
important variables, such as the incarceration rate (in the case of lott and Mustard) 
and a measure of police presence (which neither lott and Mustard nor MM include); 
and (3) lott and Mustard’s reliance on overly numerous demographic variables that 
are likely flawed by measurement error (which MM have now abandoned in response 
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to our previous critique).17
to at least provide a check on how some variations in the explanatory variables 
might influence the results in Tables 2 and 3, we offer an alternative set of explanatory 
variables (while still retaining the core choices of aggregate, hybrid estimates on state 
data, including state trends and clustering the standard errors). column 3 of table 1 
lists these explanatory variables, which contain various plausible modifications and 
additions to the previously discussed Lott and Mustard and MM specifications. These 
variables were chosen based on a priori consideration of potential weaknesses of the 
models depicted in tables 2 and 3 and were not altered after seeing the regression 
results (although we do discuss some further permutations below, such as adding in 
the crack variable). Appendix 3 provides summary statistics for these variables. 
the primary changes we employed in this robustness check were to alter 
the MM specification by dropping (1) the lagged dependent variable, (2) the crack 
variable (although this variable has little effect on the results whether included or 
not), (3) the conceptually flawed arrest rate variable, and (4) the state population 
control, which we believe is superfluous given the fact that we already control for 
population density (and weight the regression by population). As in table 3, we use 
a control for the state incarceration rate.18  We also introduce a variable that neither 
lott and Mustard nor MM employed: the number of police per 100,000 population. 
Furthermore, as illustrated in table 1, we control for a more limited number of 
demographic categories:  black males 10-39 and white males 10-39 (a total of six 
demographic controls versus 36 in the Lott and Mustard specification and seven in 
the latest MM response). Finally, as in all of the regressions we report in this reply, we 
again cluster the robust standard errors and control for state trends.
Where does this robustness check leave us? On the positive side, in terms of 
being able to draw firm conclusions, RTC laws seem to be associated with substantial 
and statistically significant increases in aggravated assault across all three sets of models 
(with the lott and Mustard estimates and our robustness check model yielding 
estimates that are both significant at the .01 level). Note that the Table 4 estimate 
of the increase in aggravated assault is quite large—roughly three times the size of 
17 For example, the lott and Mustard demographic variables identifying “other” races show 
abrupt upward jumps in 2000, likely owing to changing census treatment of  hispanic resi-
dents.
18 Initially, we used incarceration rate data provided by the sourcebook of  criminal Justice 
statistics, but then realized that this rate did not include prisoners sentenced to less than one 
year. on the other hand, prison population data provided by bJs includes all prisoners. For-
mally, BJS defines prison population to include “individuals under the jurisdiction of  state and 
federal correctional authorities” (West and sabol 2009). thus, we follow MM (2008, 2009) in 
using this prison population data (although we still call this variable “incarceration rate,” which 
is calculated as total prisoners per 100,000 population by state). however, we did find that 
MM’s prison population data for 2000 falls short of  the actual year-end numbers provided by 
bJs, which leads us to suspect that their data was based on a less-than-full year tally that was 
never updated.
Ayres And donohue
econ JournAl WAtch                 228
the table 3 estimate, but only somewhat larger than the table 2 estimate. under any 
of the three estimates, rtc laws would have led to tens of thousands of additional 
aggravated assaults. Increased levels of assault could result from increased criminal 
assaults by RTC permit holders, from those who steal or find the less protected 
guns of permit holders, and from criminals who increase their gun-carrying or their 
aggressiveness in response to rtc laws.
unfortunately, from the standpoint of gaining closure on the ultimate impact 
of rtc laws, the results on two of the other crimes once again prove to be more 
sensitive than one would like. While table 3 had suggested that rtc laws lead to a not 
insubstantial increase in rape (statistically significant at the .05 level), Table 4 suggests 
a modest opposite effect (albeit at only the .10 level). table 2 suggests, though, that 
RTC laws had no impact on rape. Indeed, if one adds crack as a control in Table 4, 
the rape results become smaller and statistically insignificant.
Table 4: The Estimated Impact of RTC Laws, All Crimes, 1977-2006 State Data, Controlling for State 
trends, Ayres and donohue explanatory Variables, With clustering
 Murder rape Aggravated Assault robbery Auto theft burglary larceny
1. Dummy variable 
model: 0.54% -3.61% -2.03% 2.40% 8.17% 1.51% 1.89%
2.72% 1.83% 3.05% 3.67% 4.16% 2.18% 1.83%
2. Spline model: 0.83% 0.08% 3.10% 0.51% -1.84% -0.22% -0.15%
0.87% 0.79% 0.81% 1.29% 0.82% 0.88% 0.74%
3. Hybrid model:
Post-passage 
dummy 0.11% -3.70% -3.68% 2.17% 9.26% 1.65% 1.99%
2.86% 1.96% 3.15% 3.96% 4.24% 2.41% 1.97%
trend effect 0.83% 0.19% 3.21% 0.44% -2.11% -0.27% -0.20%
 0.89% 0.79% 0.82% 1.35% 0.84% 0.91% 0.77%
Moreover, the estimated impact of rtc laws on auto theft is fractured across 
the three tables, with table 2 suggesting decreases, table 3 suggesting no effect, and 
Table 4 showing mixed results with large initial crime increases being offset after five 
years by rising crime. Note that if one prefers the first two models in Table 4 to the 
hybrid model, one also sees conflicting results as the dummy model (row 1) shows 
large auto theft increases, and the spline model (row 2) shows large auto theft decreases.
Again, we need to ask whether the Ayres-donohue (Ad) robustness check 
specification is working well. If the RTC law would have any beneficial impact, it 
would likely reduce robbery, which is the crime most often committed in public. yet 
in all three tables, rtc laws are associated with higher rates of robbery (although 
the results are statistically insignificant).  It is very hard to come up with a plausible 
explanation for why auto theft would fall if robbery doesn’t fall, since robbery always 
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involves confrontation with a victim (who, if armed, could threaten the robber), while 
auto theft rarely involves such a confrontation, thereby reducing any possible risk to 
the thief. Therefore, the strongly conflicting dummy and trend effects in Table 4 for 
auto theft are probably more suggestive of specification error than a true pattern of 
changing crime.
Appendix 2 provides some insight into the various regressions by examining 
the resulting estimates of rtc laws on other explanatory variables across tables 
2, 3, and 4. Note that the AD specification does generate more plausible estimates 
of the impact of incarceration on crime than the MM specification does (compare 
Appendix 2’s table A2 with table A1). nonetheless, the table A2 values from this 
appendix might also suggest problems in the operation of the Ad regressions for 
estimating the impact of incarceration (incarceration has no effect on assault and 
an unusually small, albeit negative and statistically significant, effect on rape). The 
inevitable question is whether poor estimates of the impact of incarceration on rape 
and aggravated assault provide a basis to question the Table 4 estimated effects of 
RTC laws on these two crimes. Finally, Appendix 2’s Table A4, which illustrates 
the estimated impact of police on crime, shows the anomalous result that police 
increase the level of (measured) aggravated assault. this endogeneity problem is not 
uncommon in estimating the impact of police on crime, and one must ask whether 
the Table 4 regressions are marred by this endogeneity bias or whether the Table 2 
and table 3 regressions are marred by omitted-variable bias in failing to control for 
police presence in a state.
Conclusion
What is to be made of the aggregated evidence concerning the impact of 
RTC laws when one extends the state panel data through 2006? The one consistent 
finding that is statistically significant for the hybrid model in Tables 2, 3, and 4 is 
that rtc laws increase aggravated assault. the point estimates across all three tables 
are generally consistent with higher rates of murder and robbery, although these 
estimates are not statistically significant. In general, one might assume that the biases 
from inadequate controls for crack and general measurement error would tend to bias 
those results to zero, so it may be the case that better information and models would 
reveal that rtc laws increase murder and robbery as well as aggravated assault. the 
mixed evidence on rape and auto theft leaves little basis for conclusion with respect 
to these crimes.
our Appendix 2 provides evidence concerning both the importance of the 
incarceration rate and the reliability of the various models. It does so by documenting 
the MM and Ad estimates of the effect of incarceration rate on crime across all seven 
Index I crimes. As expected, the incarceration rate is seen to statistically significantly 
reduce crime, but this finding is far stronger in the AD specification than in the MM 
model. this raises the question: if the MM model cannot correctly predict the impact 
of incarceration on crime, why should we expect it to reliably tell us the impact of 
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RTC laws on crime?19 
the clustering debate to which we have alluded provides one more indication 
that important econometric issues lurk in the background of many evaluation studies. 
other issues in the rtc literature that can have important effects on the estimated 
effects are whether state or county data is preferable (we have come to prefer state 
data, as have most crime researchers, although lott and Mustard and MM used 
county data) and whether state fixed effects should be included (as we and MM did, 
but the original lott and Mustard paper did not—see generally on this point, Wolfers 
2006). using these different approaches would broaden the array of estimates for 
many crimes. 
We also note that Jeff strnad (2007) has recently advocated in the context of 
the rtc debate that bayesian econometric approaches may provide a better way 
to identify the appropriate array of explanatory variables. In this regard, note that 
strnad found that the two most important explanatory variables for identifying the 
impact of crime in his data were the abortion rate (see donohue and levitt 2001) and 
the incarceration rate.20  If the binding limitation in these models is not the selection 
of the appropriate set of controls, but rather the need to correct for, say, endogenous 
state adoption of rtc laws, then the bayesian models that strnad presents will need 
to be further complicated. 
Finally, it is always wise to look behind the regression results and explore 
whether any actions by the police and government officials that may be correlated 
with the presence of rtc laws have had substantial impacts on reported crime (as 
opposed to actual criminal conduct). states that are more sensitive in their handling 
of rape cases, for example, may increase the proportion of victims willing to come 
forward to press charges, which can lead to greater reporting of rapes and hence 
impart an upward bias in the trend in rape. similarly, aggravated assaults are 
influenced by laws or practices that encourage the police to use “arrest” more often 
in the context of complaints of domestic violence. (Could this explain the finding 
above that more police in a state leads to more instances of aggravated assault?)  If 
19 The finding in Table A2 of  Appendix 2 that incarceration in the AD specification has vir-
tually no impact on aggravated assault also raises a number of  intriguing questions. It might 
indicate that incarceration tends to dampen every Index I crime other than aggravated assault, 
which is unaffected by large increases in the incarceration rate of  the type experienced in many 
states over the last few decades. of  the four other published estimates of  this elasticity, none is 
statistically significant, one is zero (the MM 2009 figure that we report in Table A1 of  Appen-
dix 2 in this paper), one is positive (Johnson and raphael 2006), and two have negative point 
estimates: -.056 (.053) from Marvell and Moody (1994), and -.410 (.249) from Levitt (1996). 
Alternatively, our table A2 estimate of  no effect of  incarceration on assault could suggest that 
the AD specification-check model is not working well to explain aggravated assault. If  this 
latter interpretation were correct, it would also indict the MM estimates for four of  the seven 
crime categories in our table A1 of  Appendix 2, which all show no effect of  incarceration. 
even in the other three crime categories that do show an effect, the MM estimates on incar-
ceration seem to be biased downward (again raising questions about the MM framework). 
20 one would also have to explore whether these variables should enter in ln forms or with 
quadratic terms, which again would expand the array of  permutations.
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rtc laws are adopted in states that pursue these policies more (or less) aggressively, 
then the estimated effects of rtc laws can be biased.
In sum, while the best evidence to date suggests that rtc laws at the very least 
increase aggravated assault, this comment illustrates that it is not an easy task to tease 
out the net effects of rtc laws on crime via panel data analyses. Perhaps if the states 
that were influenced by the National Rifle Association’s efforts to advance RTC laws 
had agreed both to randomly adopt the laws and to allow data to gather during 
an evaluation period of appropriate length, we would today have far more precise 
estimates of the impact of rtc laws on crime. such knowledge would likely put us 
in a better position to address the distressingly high violent crime rates that, along 
with our singular reliance on the death penalty and our enormous number of prison 
inmates and guns, mark the u.s. as unique among Western democracies.
Appendix 1: Year of Adoption of RTC Laws in 39 States and 
Philadelphia21, 22
Alabama – pre-1970s nevada – 1995
Alaska – 1994 new hampshire – 1959
Arizona – 1994 new Mexico – 2003
Arkansas – 1995 north carolina – 1995
colorado – 2003 north dakota – pre-1970s
connecticut – 1969 Ohio – 2004
Florida – 1987 oklahoma – 1995
Georgia – 1989 oregon – 1990
Idaho – 1990 Pennsylvania – 1989
Indiana – 1980 Philadelphia – 1995
Kansas – 2006 south carolina – 1996
Kentucky – 1996 south dakota – pre-1970s
louisiana – 1996 Tennessee – 1994
Maine – 1985 texas – 1995
Michigan – 2001 utah – 1995
Minnesota – 2003 Vermont – pre-1970s
Mississippi – 1990 Virginia – 1988
Missouri – 2003 Washington – 1961
Montana – 1991 West Virginia – 1989
nebraska – 2006 Wyoming – 1994
21 Moody and Marvell code Idaho’s first full year as 1992, but Ayres and Donohue code the 
first full year as 1991.  The official date of  passage, according to Idaho’s attorney general, is 
July 1, 1990.
22 there is some uncertainty as to when Indiana genuinely became a “shall-issue” state.  In the 
end—after some internal debate—we adopted 1980 as the year in which the critical shift 
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Appendix 2: Estimated Effects of Incarceration and Other 
Explanatory Variables
Tables A1 and A2 present the estimated coefficients and significance of the 
incarceration rate variable from the Moody-Marvell (MM) and Ayres-donohue (Ad) 
specifications (this variable is not included in the Lott and Mustard specifications). 
As expected, all of the significant coefficients suggest that higher incarceration rates 
decrease crime. But note that the MM specifications essentially show no effect of 
incarceration for four of the seven crime categories, which may be suggestive of 
problems in the MM models.
occurred.  Indiana enacted a concealed-carry regulation as early as 1935, when the state’s uni-
form Firearms Act mandated that no person carry a pistol outside his or her “place of  abode 
or fixed place of  business” without a license.  Studies that place Indiana’s adoption at a year 
prior to 1977 would seem to rely on the 1935 Act.  two decades later, a state court upheld 
the constitutionality of  the Act and its licensing procedure in Matthews v. state, 237 Ind. 677, 
148 N.E.2d 334 (1958).  Yet that court also held that the state’s police superintendent, rather 
than the legislature, “is capable and qualified to determine whether an applicant for a license 
to carry a pistol has a ‘proper reason’ therefore, and whether he is a ‘suitable person’ to have a 
pistol in his possession at will”—a delegation of  administrative authority indicative of  a “may-
issue” rather than a “shall-issue” policy. 
      In schubert v. debard, 398 n.e.2d 1339 (Ind. App. 1980), however, an Indiana appeals 
court ruled that the police superintendent could not use discretion to deny a license to people 
asserting a “need” to carry a concealed weapon for “self-defense.”  (the statute in question, 
IC 35-23-4.1-5, stated that that the superintendent “shall issue” a license if   “it appears to the 
superintendent that the applicant has a proper reason for carrying a handgun and is of  good 
character and reputation and a proper person to be so licensed.”)  As Gregg lee carter (2002) 
has observed, the schubert court thus made a concealed-carry permit in Indiana subject to 
“precise, open, and accessible licensing” (522-23).  the same Indiana appeals court also reaf-
firmed the holding in Schubert the following year.  In Shettle v. Shearer, 425 N.E.2d 739 (Ind. 
App. 1981), the court ruled that the superintendent could not investigate an applicant’s asser-
tion of  needing a concealed-carry permit for self-defense, and instead would simply have to 
accept the claim.  In short, it appears that Indiana did not genuinely become a shall-issue state 
at least until the schubert decision in 1980 (or, arguably, not until 1981).  We concur with the 
assessment in Grossman and lee (2008), as well as the jurisprudential analysis in carter (2002), 
that 1980 marked the key moment of  change in Indiana’s concealed-carry policy.  note, how-
ever, that the regressions in our initial reply to MM—Ayres and donohue (2009)—employed 
the same coding as Moody and Marvell (2008), which treated Indiana as adopting before 
1977. 
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Table A1: Moody-Marvell Specification: Estimated Coefficient on Incarceration Rate
 Murder rape Aggravated Assault robbery Auto theft burglary larceny
1. Dummy 
variable model: -0.07% 0.00% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.01% 0.00%
0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00%
2. Spline model: -0.07% 0.00% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.01% 0.00%
0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00%
3. Hybrid model: -0.07% 0.00% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.01% 0.00%
0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00%
Table A2: Ayres-Donohue Specification: Estimated Coefficient on Incarceration Rate
 Murder rape Aggravated Assault robbery Auto theft burglary larceny
1. Dummy 
variable model: -0.07% -0.03% 0.00% -0.09% -0.12% -0.07% -0.05%
0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01%
2. Spline model: -0.07% -0.04% -0.01% -0.09% -0.11% -0.07% -0.05%
0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01%
3. Hybrid model: -0.07% -0.03% 0.00% -0.09% -0.11% -0.07% -0.05%
0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01%
Table A3 presents the estimated coefficients and significance of the crack 
variables from the MM specification. Note that while crack is widely believed to have 
caused murder rates to rise in the late 1980s, this table suggests that crack had no 
effect on murder.
Table A3: Moody-Marvell Specification: Estimated Coefficient on Crack
 Murder rape Aggravated Assault robbery Auto theft burglary larceny
1. Dummy 
variable model: 1.38% -0.65% 0.52% 1.01% 2.45% 0.71% 0.61%
0.94% 0.34% 0.58% 0.44% 0.58% 0.37% 0.21%
2. Spline model: 1.43% -0.57% 0.69% 1.06% 2.47% 0.71% 0.62%
0.94% 0.33% 0.55% 0.43% 0.60% 0.37% 0.20%
3. Hybrid model: 1.43% -0.52% 0.68% 1.04% 2.44% 0.72% 0.59%
0.93% 0.34% 0.56% 0.45% 0.59% 0.37% 0.21%
Table A4 presents the estimated coefficients and significance of the police rate 
variables from the AD specification.
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Table A4: Ayres-Donohue Specification: Estimated Coefficient on Police Rate




variable model: -0.05% 0.04% 0.06% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 0.02%
0.05% 0.03% 0.03% 0.05% 0.06% 0.04% 0.03%
2. Spline model: -0.04% 0.04% 0.08% 0.00% -0.02% -0.01% 0.02%
0.05% 0.03% 0.03% 0.05% 0.06% 0.04% 0.03%
3. Hybrid model: -0.04% 0.04% 0.09% -0.01% -0.03% -0.01% 0.02%
0.05% 0.03% 0.03% 0.05% 0.06% 0.04% 0.03%
the general effects of the rest of the explanatory variables are as follows. 
lagged violent and property arrest rates are always negative, although not always 
significant. The unemployment rate has an ambiguous effect. The poverty rate has 
an ambiguous effect and is never significant in the MM specification. however, it 
is negative when significant in the AD specification. Personal income is negative 
when significant in the AD specification and negligible in the MM and Lott-Mustard 
(LM) specifications. Unemployment benefits have an ambiguous effect. Income 
maintenance has an ambiguous effect in the LM and AD specifications, but is for the 
most part negative when significant in the MM specification. Retirement payments 
are negative when significant.
the population control has a negligible effect. density is negative when 
significant. The all-black demographic control in the MM specification is negative 
when significant. The 10-19 age group control in the MM specification is positive 
when significant (for rape). The 20-29 age group is consistently positive, but only 
significant for rape and auto theft. The 30-39 age group has an ambiguous effect and 
is never significant. The 40-49 age group is never significant and positive for all crimes 
except aggravated assault. The 50-64 age group is positive, but only significant for 
robbery. The 65-and-over age group has an ambiguous effect and is never significant. 
In the AD specification, black males ages 10-19 and 20-29 are always positive when 
significant. Black males ages 30-39 are always positive and mostly significant. White 
males ages 10-19 have an ambiguous effect and are never significant. White males 
ages 20-29 are always positive, although ambiguously significant. White males ages 
30-39 are always negative when significant (for assault). 
          shAll-Issue debAte contInued
235                            VoluMe 6, nuMber 2, MAy 2009
Appendix 3: Summary Statistics of Ayres-Donohue Variables – 
Identifying the State and Year That Minimum and Maximum 
Variables Were Obtained for All Explanatory and Dependent 
Variables
Explanatory Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
rtc dummy variable 0.3101 0.4627 0 1
rtc trend variable 2.0620 4.4679 0 26
lagged incarceration rate 310.5 170.1 28.5 1937.9
(north dakota-1980) (d.c.-1995)
lagged police rate 267.1 69.1 73.5 931.1
(New Mexico-1994) (d.c.-1991)
real per capita:
   Personal income 19630.5 11635.48 2114.20 66392.23
(Mississippi-1977) (d.c.-2006)
   Unemployment benefits 81.69 60.30 5.62 415.20
(oklahoma-1978) (Washington-2002)
   Income maintenance 279.70 189.07 12.93 1154.86
(Wyoming-1977) (louisiana-2005)
   retirement payments 2331.66 1551.82 148.30 7555.15
(Alaska-1977) (louisiana-2005)






Poverty rate 13.22 3.37 2.9 27.2
(connecticut-1989) (Mississippi-1988)
density 241.55 511.55 0.697 11176.49
(Alaska-1977) (d.c.-1977)
Percent pop black male 10-19 0.0114 0.0076 0.0003 0.0687
(Montana-1980) (d.c.-1977)
Percent pop black male 20-29 0.0101 0.0063 0.0003 0.0657
(Vermont-1979) (d.c.-1982)
Percent pop black male 30-39 0.0088 0.0055 0.0002 0.0537
(Vermont-1977) (d.c.-1992)
Percent pop white male 10-19 0.0613 0.0108 0.0116 0.0983
(D.C.-1984) (Vermont-1977)
Percent pop white male 20-29 0.0646 0.0120 0.0239 0.1084
(hawaii-2000) (Wyoming-1980)
Percent pop white male 30-39 0.0641 0.0085 0.0231 0.0973
(hawaii-2004) (Alaska-1986)
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Dependent Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Murder rate 7.71 3.95 0.16 81.25
(North Dakota-1994) (d.c.-1991)
rape rate 35.46 11.56 7.39 100.60
(north dakota-1985) (Alaska-1981)
Aggravated assault rate 339.32 149.07 31.48 1562.05
(north dakota-1983) (d.c.-1993)
robbery rate 200.27 123.91 6.40 1632.78
(north dakota-1997) (d.c.-1981)
Auto theft rate 497.53 222.15 91.06 1853.15
(south dakota-2006) (d.c.-1996)
burglary rate 1097.65 437.48 307.88 2871.15
(new hampshire-1999) (nevada-1980)
larceny rate 2820.78 701.45 1179.00 5862.61
(south dakota-2006) (d.c.-1995)
Appendix 4: Definition of Per Capita Personal Income
According to the bureau of economic Analysis (beA), personal income is 
“the income received by all persons from all sources. Personal income is the sum 
of net earnings by place of residence, rental income of persons, personal dividend 
income, personal interest income, and personal current transfer receipts. net earnings 
is earnings by place of  work (the sum of  wage and salary disbursements (payrolls), 
supplements to wages and salaries, and proprietors’ income) less contributions for 
government social insurance, plus an adjustment to convert earnings by place of  work 
to a place-of-residence basis. Personal income is measured before the deduction of  
personal income taxes and other personal taxes and is reported in current dollars (no 
adjustment is made for price changes)” (beA 2009).
Furthermore, per capita personal income is “calculated as the total personal 
income of  the residents of  a state divided by the population of  the state. In computing 
per capita personal income, beA uses the census bureau’s annual midyear population 
estimates” (beA 2009). In 2008, the average per capita personal income in the united 
states was $39,751.
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